The number of m-commerce users is exponentially increasing and the m-commerce has become popular because m-commerce allows us to pay for goods or services anytime, anywhere using mobile devices. A number of the mobile payment scheme has been proposed to ensure security requirements on m-commerce. However, several of them are vulnerable to various attacks. This paper proposes an enhanced lightweight mobile payment scheme based on two gateways. We show that the proposed scheme ensures necessary security requirements such as accountability, untraceability, unlinkability and double spending prevention. In addition, it is suitable for lightweight mobile payment environments by analyzing and comparing it with the related mobile payment scheme.
Introduction
With the rapid development of network technologies, the number of m-commerce user is exponentially increasing because users can make the electronic payment on mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones [1] [2] . Since such mobile devices have low-power, limited memory and low-computational capacity, the m-commerce needs to employ lightweight payment protocols. In recent years, various authentication protocols for secure mobile payment have been proposed using NFC, smart card, and biometrics [3] - [9] .
Sureshkumar et al. [10] introduced two gateway based payment scheme, and then Sureshkumar et al. [11] also proposed an enhanced lightweight protocol based on two gateways using dynamic identity. They claim that their scheme satisfies security requirement for mobile payment such as unlinkability, accountability and untraceability, and reduces computational complexity than other related works. However, their schemes have some drawbacks.
In this paper, we propose a security enhanced lightweight mobile payment scheme based on two gateways to solve the drawbacks of existing schemes. Our proposed scheme meets the various security requirements such as accountability, untraceability, unlinkability, double spending prevention and DoS attack prevention. The comparisons of security and computational complexity with related works show that our scheme is definitely improved and more practical in lightweight mobile payment environments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We briefly discuss related payment schemes in Section 2. Our proposed scheme is shown in detail in Section 3. We analyze the security of the proposed scheme and compare it with those of related works in Section 5. Section 6 is a brief conclusion. 
Related Works
In 2015, Luo et al. [2] proposed an NFC-based user registration scheme for mobile payment to provide user's anonymity and unlinkability in the further transaction process. They use a virtual account issued by the issuer and a virtual card issued by the payment gateway to ensure anonymity of users and unlinkability in transactions. However, their scheme is vulnerable to DoS attacks and has symmetric key leakage problems. Furthermore, they use the public key cryptography and signature. Therefore, their scheme is not suitable for lightweight payment environments. In 2016, Sureshkumar et al. [9] proposed a lightweight two gateway based payment scheme with dynamic identity. Their scheme uses a symmetric key encryption. Therefore, their scheme is suitable for lightweight payment environments. However, their scheme also is vulnerable to DoS attacks and does not prevent double spending.
The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a security enhanced lightweight mobile payment scheme based on two payment gateway. The mobile payment mechanism for the proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Our proposed scheme has four participants: the customer, the merchant, and two payment gateways. We assume that there is an internally secure network among the two issuers, the acquirer and the two gateways. That is, they communicate each other in secure channel. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on a lightweight payment process along with the customer, the merchant, and the gateways. The notations used in proposed scheme are shown in Table I .
 The customer wants to purchase goods or service through the merchant's website. However, the balance in any one of the credit cards is not enough to pay. But, the sum of balance for two cards is enough. Therefore, the customer will buy the product using two cards via different gateways. Phase 1 -Initiating payment Initially, the customer selects goods or services through the merchant`s website, and starts initial payment phase with the merchant.
Lightweight Mobile Payment Protocols
Step 1. The customer C generates his temporary transaction identity and order description , and sends the payment request 1 = { , , ℎ 1 } to merchant , where the keyed hash value ℎ 1 = ( , ) .
Step 2. After receiving the 1 , the merchant generates transaction information and computes
Phase 2 -payment with gateway Step 1. The computes , and sends it to M. Step 6. After receiving the response messages, the M decrypts the messages 7 and 9 , and computes = 1 ⋀ 2 , total amount = 1 + 2 and the response message 10 = { 2 , , , 3 } . The M then sends 10 to C. Fig. 2 . An enhanced lightweight mobile payment scheme based on two gateways.
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3.2.3.
Phase 3 -Commitment phase Step 1. After receiving the 10 , the C checks whether the total amount is correct and is true. If it holds, the C computes 11 ={ , , 4 , ℎ 4 ,continue} , and sends it to M in order to express that he/she wants to continue the payment processes, otherwise the customer aborts payment, where ℎ 4 = ( , , , 3 ).
Step 2. After receiving the 11 , the merchant checks whether timestamp 4 is within a tolerable period and the customer wants to continue. If it holds, the merchant computes the commit message
1 } and sends it to gateway 1 .
Step 3. The 1 decrypts the received message 12 , and checks whether timestamp 5 is within a tolerable period. If it holds, the 1 verifies keyed hash message value using
1
. If it is valid, the 1 computes the response message 13 = { , , ℎ( 4 , , )
1 }, and sends this committed message to merchant.
Step 4. The M computes the commit message 14 = { ,
2 } and sends it to 2 .
Step 5. The 2 decrypts the received message 14 , and checks whether timestamp 5 is within a tolerable period. If it holds, the 2 verifies keyed hash message value using
2
. If it is valid, the 2 computes the response message 15 = { , , ℎ( 5 , , ) 
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze our proposed scheme in terms of security and computational complexity. Table  II shows security comparisons of our scheme and other related schemes. Table III shows a computational complexity comparison of the proposed scheme and other related schemes. These two tables said that the proposed scheme is lightweight in terms of computational complexity, and more secure than other mobile payment scheme.
Accountability
In the proposed scheme, accountability issues are not caused because the commitment phase is performed after confirming the customer's consent. In addition, the freshness of commitment messages is guaranteed by symmetric keys and timestamps. So the customer is able to start a fresh transaction for buying products or services.
Untraceability
The customer uses a temporary transaction identity and different dynamic identities for the two gateways. Thus, different payments of a same customer cannot be linked. Therefore, our scheme satisfies untraceability property because an attacker is unable to distinguish a particular customer.
Unlinkability
Unlinkability is a strong anonymity. In our scheme, an adversary cannot know a customer's real identity. If the transaction information is revealed, nobody knows who the customer is. Thus, our scheme satisfies unlinkability property.
Double Spending Prevention
In [9] , it is possible to implement double spending by replay attacks. However, the proposed scheme is secure against replay attacks by adding the timestamp into the messages. Though an adversary intercepts
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the previous authentication message, and sends it to the merchant or gateway, the merchant and gateway can check the illegality of the message using checking the timestamp. In addition, because every authentication message is encrypted as well, the adversary cannot forge the timestamp. Thus, the proposed scheme can prevent double spending.
DoS attack Prevention
In [9] , the attacker can perform DoS attacks in the payment agreement phase because the merchant accepts any message and then response with encrypted messages. However, in the proposed scheme, the customer sends keyed hash value ℎ 1 . To verify ℎ 1 , both of the customer and the merchant need to have a key . Therefore, the merchant checks if the customer is vaild. So the proposed scheme can prevent DoS attacks.
Conclusion
This paper proposes an enhanced lightweight mobile payment scheme based on two gateways. The security analysis and comparisons show the proposed scheme meets the necessary security properties such as double spending prevention, DoS attack prevention, and etc. Furthermore, the proposed is efficient in terms of computational complexity, compared to other existing schemes. Therefore, the proposed mobile payment scheme is more suitable and practical for lightweight mobile payment environments. In the future work, we will simplify the proposed scheme to provide a more lightweight m-commerce protocol and maintain the security requirements. In addition, performance evaluation to analyze the actual operating time will be performed.
